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ABSTRACT
This paper reviews the current state of real estate
finance, the types of creative financing structures being used
today and their applicability to various deal sizes and finishes
with a look at new financial products being tested in the market
in response to future trends in the real estate business. The
purpose in conducting this research is to, (1) track the
evolution of the business in an effort to understand what
circumstances led to the creation of these new products, (2)
find out how (or if) they are being used by the real estate
community and, (3) discuss what may be the upcoming trends in
real estate finance.
In assembling this study a total of 28 professionals
representing a broad spectrum of real estate participants from
both sides of the table (buyers/lenders and sellers/borrowers)
were interviewed. Their thoughts are represented herein. The
perspective of this study is primarily that of the developer in
financing, refinancing or selling a commercial project. As a
result, creative secondary market vehicles such as CMO's and
REMIC's are not addressed.
Thesis Supervisor: Marc Louargand
Title: Lecturer
Department of Urban Studies and Planning
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THE EVOLUTION OF CREATIVE REAL ESTATE FINANCING TECHNIQUES:
STRUCTURES AND APPLICATIONS
CHAPTER I. INTRODUCTION
PURPOSE
The commercial real estate finance industry has undergone a
period of change during the last twenty years that has
transformed it from a relatively straight forward process of
acquiring funds for development, sale and refinancing with a
limited number of variables to one of increasing complexity and
financial variety. According to Tom Klutznick, co-managing
partner of Miller, Klutznick, Davis, Gray:
Twenty years ago most commercial real estate
financing followed a basic formula established by the
large institutional investors. A developer secured
his permanent financing with a twenty-five year fixed
rate mortgage commitment for 75-80% of value at 5
1/2% interest. With this forward commitment in hand,
and more demand than supply in most cases, securing a
construction loan was a relatively simple procedure.
A "complex" loan meant, instead of financing 75% of
value, the developer would finance 100% of the deal
and give the lender 25% equity in the project.
Today, structuring the financing is the.single most
complicated and important task facing a developer.
This paper reviews the current state of real estate
finance, the types of creative structures being used today and
their applicability to various deal sizes and finishes with a
look at new financial products being tested in the market in
response to future trends in the real estate business. The
purpose in conducting this research is to, (1) track the
5
evolution of the business in an effort to understand what
circumstances led to the creation of these new products, (2)
find out how (or if) they are being used by the real estate
community and, (3) discuss what may be the upcoming trends in
real estate finance.
The financing tools discussed herein were created in
response to changes in economic forces that impact real estate
finance. The industry came from a period of almost
monopolistic control of funds by the large insurance companies
and banks, a time of stable interest rates, an undersupply of
commercial space and a tax favorable environment. Through the
effects of changes in the nation's economy, inflation,
competition and tax legislation the industry has been forced to
respond to today's environment of:
1. Competition to place funds
2. Oversupply of commercial space
3. Increased volatility of interest rates
4. Changing Tax Status
How the finance products created have dealt with these issues
is critically evaluated.
In the recent past, the number of financial structures has
increased dramatically and there is no "standard formula" for
real estate debt from the lending community anymore.
Convertible and participating loans allow debt to function as
equity. Accrual and zero coupon mortgages defer interest
payments. Interest rate swaps convert floating rate loans to
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fixed or vice versa. Preferred returns, disproportionate
participation in equity, earn-outs, etc. all complicate the
standardized lending practices of the past. The options are
only limited by the two parties' creativity.
The emergence in the early 1980's of Wall Street into the
real estate world and their access to entirely new and untapped
capital markets opened the financing arena even further.
Commercial paper, mortgage backed bonds and various other
securitized financing techniques have now been added to the
developer's array of financial tools.
The rules of the game have changed as well. Commercial
real estate supply greatly exceeds demand in many areas of the
country causing lenders to be more wary of the viability of many
projects. However, at the same time, there is seemingly more
money chasing real estate investments than ever before. The
roles of the players have been reversed in some cases with
lenders and corporations becoming developers and developers
acting as hired "consultants" working for fees only.
In assembling this study a total of 28 professionals
representing a broad spectrum of real estate participants from
both sides of the table (buyers/lenders and sellers/borrowers)
were interviewed. Their thoughts are represented herein. The
perspective of this report is primarily that of the developer in
financing, refinancing or selling a commercial project. As a
result, creative secondary market vehicles such as CMO's and
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REMIC's are not addressed.
REASONS FOR CREATIVE STRUCTURES
The development business, due to the large sums of money
involved, has always been a highly leveraged business.
Therefore, financing has a significant impact on the viability
of any new project. Pre-1970 the financial markets were less
volatile and setting up a real estate deal was not as time
intensive. As a result, developers could count on substantially
the same financing terms at the time a project was conceived as
when the loan was secured. Rates were fixed so there was no
interst rate risk after loan closing. When the prime rate shot
up to 20% in the mid-1970's, reacting to double-diget inflation,
the lending institutions were left with a portfolio of long term
5 1/2% loans on the books and no way out for years to come.
This new environment of rate volatility changed the way
lenders viewed mortgage loans. The result was floating rate
loans, shorter terms and a decrease in lender's willingness to
make forward commitments for fixed rate, take-out financing.
The impact of the development surge of the early 1980's'
is still being felt in the lending community where it seems
savings and loans go under weekly from an abundance of
non-performing real estate loans. The reaction to this
situation has been the demise of both non-recourse financing and
the 100% loan for all but the most creditworthy developers.
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Equity requirements are much higher (30% or more) for many
projects today and additional security is usually a
pre-requisite.
The developer's needs throughout this period of fluctuation
have remained essentially unchanged. They want the lowest rate
available, to finance as much as possible to keep their own
money out of the deal, to limit risk with non-recourse debt and,
upon completion, they want to get the value they have created
out of the project while paying the minimum amount of tax.
New products were created as developers and lenders
attempted to resolve their often mutually exclusive goals.
Structures were designed in reaction to the demands of the
parties to match lenders and investors needs to the ability of
the real estate to perform. Benefits were put into the hands of
the parties that could use them the most. Therefore, according
to Charles Burd II, a Principal with Aldrich, Eastman & Waltch,
Inc., "the most efficient way to finance a deal today is to
prioritize the developer's objectives for the project (i.e. take
cash out, lowest cost of capital, minimize risk, etc.) then
design the structure to meet those needs while maintaining the
lender's yield on his funds". This is a fundamental departure
from the standardized, often dictated approach of the past.
For example, a common problem between developer and lender
when the developer is trying to finance out of his property is
the value difference each party places on the property. The
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developer might capitalize "effective" rental rates to arrive at
value while the lender caps face, or nominal, rates. The
developer's goal is to maximize up front cash and he is willing
to take less cash flow from the property. The solution can be a
short term solution such as an earn-out, guarantee, or developer
funding of lease concessions. These solutions will "prop up"
the property for 3-5 years and help justify a higher value. A
more long term solution might be a participating loan that
grants a cummulative preferred return of cash-flow to the lender
set at some level so that the developer only participates if the
property meets his aggressive estimate of value. In both cases,
the lender gets his desired yield and, if the developer's
estimate of income from the property is correct, he gets his
desired amount of up front cash and overall return.
Avoiding or deferring tax, especially since the Tax Reform
Act of 1986, is a major reason for using a creative mortgage
structure. In this regard, the developer and the lender's goals
are closely alligned: characterize all payments as interest
whenever possible and take as much money out of the project
while deferring payment of tax on the gain as long as possible.
Interest on debt is a deductable expense for the developer and
if he can characterize more of his loan payment as interest, he
can afford to pay the lender a higher rate. Therefore,
structures were created that allowed the lender to "participate"
in the upside of the property, like an equity owner, while still
characterizing the payments as interest ("contingent interest").
The participation component of participating and convertible
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mortgages qualifies as interest in the eyes of the IRS as long
as certain guidelines are met for percentage of actual equity in
the project.
Real Estate today is often re-financed instead of sold
because the proceeds from re-financing are not considered a
gain, and therefore are not taxable, until the property is
actually sold. Participating and convertible mortgages allow
an owner to "finance out" of a property (get his equity out in
the form of a loan) while giving the lender some of the benefits
of equity. The ground lease and the tax free exchange are also
ways to minimize or defer tax payments.
New York is the most extreme example of the impact of taxes
on the economics of a real estate sale. The addition of a 10%
state tax ("Cuomo Tax") on top of the 33% federal tax and
various city taxes means that the seller loses almost 50% of his
profit to tax! (The 10% state tax even applies to tax exempt
entities such as pension funds). As a result, property in New
York is much more likely to be.financed with a participating
structure or sold with a tax free exchange than to be sold
outright.
The variety of structures associated with the
securitization of commercial real estate were created in
reaction to the limited number of financing alternatives
available to large scale developments. There are few
traditional -lenders capable of providing complete mortgage
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financing in some of today's mega projects ($100+ million).
So Wall Street created products that could break down a large
deal into many smaller pieces thereby opening new options for
developers to seek financing and establishing a more competitive
market for these large loans. Some securitized structures allow
the developer to finance a larger percentage of his property's
value and allow him to do it on a non-recourse basis (although
some type of guarantee is usually provided by a third party).
Dividing and re-apportioning risk is a primary reason for
using creative financing structures. Interest rate risk can be
limited or removed entirely by the use of hedges. Market risks
that impact equity value can be spread among more parties with
the use of a participating feature. Personal financial risk can
be mitigated with non-recourse financing and by using the
minimum amount of equity to develop the project.
Finally, achieving the lowest possible interest rate makes
the additional effort required in structuring a creative deal
worthwhile in the minds of many developers, especially ones with
large projects. A few basis points can mean hundreds of
thousands of dollars in additional cash flow from a property
during the life of the loan. Taking advantage of the
traditionally lower rates at the "short end of the yield curve"
was a major impetus in the creation of commercial paper as a
real estate financing tool. Accrual and zero coupon mortgages
minimize interest expenses during the early years of the project
and, although all of the interest must eventually be paid, the
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accrued interest is deferred until the project can more easily
support it.
FINANCIAL MARKETS
Real estate lending was traditionally a function of two
base rates: the prime rate and the treasury bond rate. Short
term construction lending was based on a spread above the prime
rate and, according to Adrian Corbiere, Vice President of The
New England Insurance Company Mortgage Department, long term
(take out) financing from the insurance companies was fixed at
about 2 1/2% above the then current treasury rate for credit
borrowers. Today, to be fully versed in the state of the real
estate financing markets, a developer must be up to date and
have a complete understanding of the workings of the London
Interbank Offered Rate (LIBOR), commercial paper rates, rated
corporate bond yields and the Eurodollar time deposit rate as
well as the traditional index rates (prime, treasuries).
The various rates can be broken down into three categories:
1. Base rates
2. Long-term rates
3. Short-term rates.
1. Base Rates
Base rates, or index rates, -are used by lenders as an index
above (or sometimes below) which an interest rate will be set.
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Base rates were traditionally the prime rate and the various
terms of treasuries. The new entrant into the field of index
rates is the London Interbank Offered Rate (LIBOR), the rate
paid between banks in London on 90-day deposits of U.S.
dollars.
In the case of treasuries, the rate is based upon the
credit of the U.S. government and is therefore considered
essentially risk free. As a result, all real estate loans based
on treasuries are quoted as a spread above this base. Prime
rate is a rate established by the large commercial banks as a
base rate for consumers and small companies ("borrowers that
come thru the front door"). The traditional definition of prime
as the lowest rate offered to the bank's largest customers is
not used anymore since many loans to high credit corporations,
and even some real estate developers, are set as a fixed number
of basis points below prime. LIBOR is the base for
international lending and is used by many domestic lenders since
it is considered more sensitive to the supply and demand for
funds than the prime rate and, therefore, more representative of
the actual state of the capital markets.
2. Long Term Rates
Long-term rates, as the name implies, are the rates offered
borrowers for loans of 10 years duration or longer. Included in
I
this category are the traditional prime or treasury based
permanent mortgage loans and, with the advent of securitization,
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rated corporate bond rates.
The spread over treasuries or prime offered by long term
lenders for permanent mortgage loans is largely a function of
the developer's credit history, the quality of the project, the
amount and availability of funds from the lender and the
competitiveness of other lenders vying to put out funds. Rates
for these loans can run from 125 basis points over treasury
bonds (approximately 9.5% today) for secure, good credit deals
to 400 basis points above prime (15%) for forward commitments on
smaller riskier deals.
Long term bonds had not been used as a real estate
financing tool since the 1920's. They were revived in 1985 when
a mortgage backed bond was issued for the financing of the
American Express headquarters building in Manhattan.2 This
opened an entirely new avenue for long funds and essentially
broke the insurance company and pension fund lock on the $100
million and up, long term market. Now securities could be
issued directly from the owner to the buyer avoiding the bank,
much as corporations had done for years. Interest rates for
these funds depend largely upon the rating applied to the real
estate by one of the rating agencies (Standard & Poors, Moodys,
Duff & Phelps) or the credit enhancement acquired if the issue
is not rated. Current rates are just under 9% for the highest
rating (AAA,Aaa,l) to 10% for lower rated, although still high
quality, issues.
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3. Short Term Rates
Short term rates in real estate were traditionally defined
as a function of what the banks would offer for construction
financing pegged at a certain number of basis points above
prime. Twenty years ago these loans were often fixed rate
loans but more recently bank construction lending has become a
variable rate facility fluctuating with the prime rate or LIBOR.
Use of short term capital markets were not an option for real
estate borrowers until commercial paper was introduced into real
estate finance in the early 1980's.
With this innovation, a developer with a sufficiently large
project could borrow at short term rates (traditionally lower
than long term rates) and, through interest rate hedges, fix or
limit the upward movement of the rate for the long term thereby
avoiding the two part construction loan/permanent loan format of
the past. They had the best of both worlds; low, short term
rates that could be fixed for an indefinite period of time (the
term of the hedge). Short term rates range from commercial
paper rates of 9% up to floating construction loans at 2-3%
above prime (13-14%) for less creditworthy borrowers.
FINANCIAL MARKETS: CURRENT THEMES
The current state of the real estate finance markets is not
only characterized by a variety of new products and options for
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developers as described above, but by the following themes:
1. Increased demand for real estate investments
2. Increased caution by real estate investors
3. Inverted yield curve
The first two trends seem to be in conflict with one another.
As more money is pumped into the total supply of funds available
to purchase real estate, the expected result should be more
funds trickling down to lesser quality investments since there
is only a limited supply of class "A" quality projects. The
reality is, after the overbuilding of the early 1980's, many
investors are extremely cautious in deciding to whom they
would lend their money and it may, in fact, be more difficult
for small projects to find funding. The dichotomy of too much
money thrown into a cautious market causes lending rates for the
best projects to be bid down to very low levels while the lesser
quality projects either don't get funded or the terms become
onerous to the point of making the deal marginally economic.
Most institutional investors interviewed for this report
complained about not being able to get the money out fast enough
and the larger developers often enthusiastically commented about
the high loan-to-value, below prime loans available to them
today. At the same time, less creditworthy developers bemoaned
the difficulty in finding financing, the high rates, the
increased equity required and the resistance from long term
lenders towards making forward commitments. The result is a
wide disparity in available rates based on creditworthiness.
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Although a short term event, the inverted yield curve is
having a significant influence on today's finance market. Short
term rates have historically been lower than long term fixed
rates due to the risk of not being able to adjust long interest
rates should the base rates increase over time. In an inverted
curve environment, short term rates are equal or greater than
long term rates. The result is that long term, traditonal
non-participating mortgage rates from institutional investors
are cheaper than say commercial paper rates after all of the
added expenses of credit enhancement, swaps and fees are taken
into account.
From the real estate perspective, the bidding down of
long term mortgage rates can be attributed to increased
competition for deals from a variety of sources:
1. Japanese banks lending and investing at rates below
domestic banks and institutions
2. Securitization creating new, competitive markets for
developers to use to fund their projects
3. Traditional real estate lenders (insurance companies
and pension funds), perceiving a threat to one of
their primary investment options (at the same time
they are increasing their real estate portfolio
percentage of ever larger investment funds), accepting
significantly lower spreads (down 100-125 basis points)
than their traditional standards.
The primary beneficiary of this situation is the established,
creditworthy developer who is developing medium to large scale
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projects.
PARTICIPANTS IN REAL ESTATE FINANCE
The number of players in real estate finance has increased
dramatically from the limited number of funding sources
available 20 years ago. The insurance companies and domestic
commercial banks began to lose their monopoly on real estate
funding in the 70's when syndicators injected a new source of
funds, the small individual investor, into the market. Equipped
with "can't lose" tax incentives, the limited partnership
investment, both public and private placement, sold extremely
well until T.R.A. of 1986.
The securitization and foreign investment trends of the
1980's created more competition and opened entirely new methods
of investing in real estate. Securitization through the
investment banks, brought money market funds (purchasers of
commercial paper) and rated debt security purchasers into a
market previously ignored by these investors. Foreign banks and
cash rich investors, primarily from Japan, were willing to
accept lower yields than their domestic counterparts and found
fertile ground in secure U.S. real estate.
The primary participants in real estate finance today are:
SOURCES OF FUNDS
1. Insurance companies
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2. Pension funds
3. Domestic commercial banks and savings and loans
4. Foreign commercial banks
5. Individuals
BROKERS OF FUNDS
1. Investment banks
2. Syndicators
The following is a discussion of the roles each of these
participants play in real estate finance and the types of loans
they are currently making.
SOURCES OF FUNDS
1. Insurance Companies
The insurance companies were, for many years, the only
source of long term debt financing for large real estate
projects. As noted earlier, the standard formula that worked
during this period was the 25 year fixed rate loan at treasuries
plus 2 1/2%. The increased volatility of the financial markets
and the alternate sources of funds available to developers today
has caused the 2 1/2% spread to be reduced to 1-1.25% and the
length of the term to be reduced, thru balloon payments, from
the 25 year standard of the past.
Although insurance companies have traditionally been
categorized as conservative debt investors, hybrid loans and
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joint ventures in high quality properties are becoming a more
common investment. Some insurance companies have set up a
subsidiary to invest in riskier deals, such as the New England
Life Insurance Company with Copley Real Estate Advisors. The
New England's mortgage department does debt lending and some
participating loans while Copley makes equity investments and
more creative hybrid loans.
Long term mortgage yields are currently in the 9-10% range
and participating IRR's are 10 1/2%-11% for prime property and
up to 12 1/2% for less secure investments. Although capable of
making very large loans ($100 million), minimum deal sizes range
as low as $2 million.
2. Pension Funds
Pension funds and insurance companies have traditionally
shared very similar investment goals since their source of funds
is directed towards the long term (retirement and death). It is
not surprising then to find that real estate investment
departments of large insurance companies invest a great deal of
pension fund money, in an advisory capacity, along with their
own funds. In addition to the insurance companies, independent
pension fund advisory companies have been set up to assist, for
a fee, in identifying and purchasing real estate for the various
large government and corporate pension funds.
Pension funds are primarily interested in owning real
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estate either thru direct equity investments or
participating/convertible structures. Overall yields are 11%
(IRR) and up with a preference for the largest component of that
return (preferably over 8%) to be annual cash flow, as opposed
to high residual value. Minimum investment is typically $5
million.
3. Domestic Commercial Banks and Savings and Loans
The historic niche of the commercial bank in real estate
finance was as a floating rate, short term lender for the
construction phase of the project. Upon completion of
construction, the bank would be "taken out" by a long term
lender.
Banks provide straight debt financing almost exclusively
and hybrid loans do not fit into their loan program since most
hybrids offer a reduced coupon for a share of the equity.
According to Dan Lupiani, Vice President of the First National
Bank of Chicago, "banks do not usually offer this type of loan
since they must cover their immediate cost of funds with current
coupons" (match funds). Creative loan "features" such as
interest rate caps, collars and swaps are available from banks
but, with a few notable exceptions (i.e. Citicorp), banks are
not generally considered to be innovators in creative real
estate finance. Many of the new financing instruments are
designed to avoid the commercial bank altogether.
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Bank and savings & loan originated variable rate
construction loans range from a point below prime (10%) to 2-3%
above prime (13-14%). Loan amounts are restricted at the top
end by bank lending limits. Extremely large loans (over $100
million) may be allocated among several institutions to avoid
too much exposure for one institution.
4. Foreign Commercial Banks
The foreign banks (primarily Japanese) have only recently
become a force in U.S. real estate lending. "In Japan, banks do
not make real estate loans. They base their lending for
development projects on the credit of the company that will be
both developing and occupying the property"3 (build-to-suit with
the corporation acting as the developer). For example, Sony
would build a project for their own use and a Japanese bank
would lend the money to Sony, not a developer, based on Sony's
credit rating. There are very few large "developers", as we
define them, in Japan. Therefore, many Japanese banks are just
learning how to do construction loans and how to calculate
developer draws, etc. More creative structures are not
currently offered but may be in the future.
When the learning process in structuring more complex deals
is complete, Japanese banks have the potential to become an
increasingly formidable participant in U.S. real estate lending
for the following reasons:
1. Higher loan limits
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2. Lower interest rates
3. AAA rating
Single source funding for very large projects is difficult to
acquire with domestic lenders. The alternative is
securitization or Japanese banks. Where securitization can take
months to bring to market and, in today's interest rate
environment, may not be cost efficient, Japanese banks stand
ready to lend extremely large sums at rates below U.S. banks
with the added advantage of a quick closing.
Most of the largest banks in the world are Japanese and
many carry a AAA credit rating. Developers who decide to
utilize securitized financing options and require a AAA credit
enhancement to qualify for the lowest rates will increasingly be
turning to Japanese banks.
Today, Japanese banks only provide construction lending
(debt), interest rate hedges and credit enhancements.
Participating, convertible or accrual loans are not done.
Minimums can be very high ($50 million) and loans well over $100
million are within the lending limits.
5. Individuals
At the lower end of the investment range ($8-10 million
average), private investors play an important role in providing
funds to deals that do not meet the institutional minimums or
loan criteria. Private investors, either investing directly or
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through advisors, provide equity or hybrid funds to higher risk
deals in anticipation of IRR's of up to 30%
BROKERS OF FUNDS
1. Investment Banks
The investment bank's entry into the real estate finance
arena is not as a direct source of funds for real estate
investment, but as a fee compensated broker of outside capital
sources to developers in need of funds. As noted earlier, the
primary reason for their involvement is to offer a method
whereby developers can access alternate sources of funds for
very large financings.
Wall Street has explored a variety of methods, in the last
five years, designed to break down large deals into smaller
increments to provide debt or equity, either through
securitization or more typical financing techniques, to these
large financings. They will arrange commercial paper programs,
mortgage backed securities, private placements, joint ventures,
REITs, and various equity and debt structures. The common
element is that the deal has to be of sufficient size ($50
million and up) or the fee will not be large enough to warrant
their involvement.
2.Syndicators
The syndication business has fallen on hard times as a
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result of the 1986 Tax Reform Act and the elimination of the
lucrative tax incentives previously associated with these deals.
Similar to the investment banks, syndicators are middlemen who
usually do not provide source funding. Their contribution is
their ability to market a real estate product to individual
investors. Investment in syndicated deals has fallen off
dramatically in recent years and, as a result, these groups are
not as significant a force in real estate finance as they once
were.
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CHAPTER II. CREATIVE FINANCING STRUCTURES:
DEFINITION, COSTS AND APPLICATION
There is a broad selection of new financial options
available to the developer today. Participating, convertible
and accrual mortgages, ground leases, mortgage backed bonds,
commercial paper, REITs, limited partnerships, etc., are all
finding applications in real estate finance. This section
reviews the selection of creative financing instruments
available to developers along with a discussion of their costs
and applications in various deal situations.
BARRIERS TO ENTRY
Although the list of new structures is impressive, there
are restrictions to the implementation of these techniques,
that, in reality, serve to limit their applicability to specific
sizes and types of transactions. The small project and the less
experienced developer are not granted access to the same number
of options available to the large project and major development
company. In defining and discussing each structure, guidelines
for their use are set forth with regard to the following
limitations:
1. Knowledge and expertise
2. Lender imposed minimums
3. Creditworthiness
4. Economies of scale - cost
5. Administrative and opportunity cost
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1. Knowledge and Expertise
The first problem many developers have is little knowledge
and no experience with these new techniques since the real
estate finance industry has experienced so many changes in such
a short period of time. one pension fund advisor expressed
amazement at the lack of knowledge developers, including major
players who are borrowing hundreds of millions of dollars, have
of the financing alternatives available.
2. Lender Imposed Minimums
Even if a developer is experienced in their use, scale
economies lead lenders to impose minimum size requirements that
rule out many techniques to all but the very largest financings.
Many of the structures have fees associated with them that are
based on a percentage of the total funding, so investment
banks do not deal in medium or small transactions due to the
limited size of the fees. They claim that it takes as much
time to do a $20 million financing as it does a $200 million
financing.
3. Creditworthiness
Probably the biggest obstacle to small and medium sized
developers is the credit issue. The techniques that often
provide the lowest cost of funds are also the ones that require
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the highest credit rating. Most developers typically structure
their business entities into limited partnerships on a
project-by-project basis and as a result, do not have an entity
with a significant number of assets available to rate.
Therefore, either the property must stand alone for the rating
or a rating must be "purchased" from a highly rated organization
such as a major bank or insurance company. Purchasing a rating
does not avoid the scrutiny of a developer's creditworthiness
since, instead of the rating agency performing the due
diligence, the entity that is providing their rating performs
it. This also adds a significant layer of cost, as much as 6%,
that may make credit enhanced financings uneconomical.
4. Economies of Scale - Cost
To elaborate on the cost issue, acquiring the rating or
credit enhancement is far from the only fee that has to be
figured into the cost of funds for the various complex
structures. Attorney fees for the documentation and investment
banker or syndicator fees for issuing and marketing these deals
make up a significant portion of the third party expenses. The
lender, of course, earns fees for closing, administration and
spreads over his base rate for underwriting risk.
5. Administrative and Opportunity Cost
Finally, if the deal still makes sense after all of these
issues are considered, the developer needs to ask himself if the
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time commitment and administrative effort are worth it for the
savings realized and if he can afford to wait the six months or
more it takes to complete a complex funding and get his money.
With many of these techniques only providing marginal savings in
today's environment, the answer seems to be "no" for an
increasing number of potential participants.
Figure 1. shows the deal sizes that most appropriately suit
the financing structure indicated.
FIGURE 1.
CREATIVE FINANCING STRUCTURES SHOWN BY
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MORTGAGES
Although not included in our definition of "creative"
financing tools, the conventional mortgage loan has gone thru
some changes worth noting in the last twenty years. The goal of
these modifications has been to reduce the lender's risk in what
is generally regarded as an overbuilt real estate environment
and to respond to extreme fluctuations in the interest rate
markets.
"Equity is king"' seems to be the phrase that typifies the
lender's attitude towards loan-to-value ratios. Loan amounts on
most deals are down in relation to appraised value to give the
lender an extra margin of safety in case the deal runs into
problems. Debt coverage ratios are higher for the same reason.
Rate fluctuations have fostered a trend among lenders
towards shorter term loans and higher penalties for not allowing
a loan to run its full course. To protect good loans in a
declining rate environment, lenders incorporate severe
pre-payment penalties ("yield maintenance") and, to limit long
term exposure when rates are moving up, floating rate loans and
balloon payments have become the norm for certain types of
loans.
The volatility of rates has also caused the forward loan
commitment ("take out") to become a more difficult commitment
to acquire. The "mini-perm" loan with a term of five years or
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less (usually obtained after completion of construction but
before a permanent loan is secured)2 is an offshoot of this new
attitude toward shorter commitments. A mini-perm that serves as
both a construction loan with a floating coupon during the
construction period and a short term "permanent" loan that
automatically fixes the rate at the end of construction, is a
new twist to this mortgage product.
PARTICIPATING MORTGAGE - DEFINITION
The participating mortgage is not a particularly new
innovation but it seems to be finding broader applications in
today's real estate financing environment. The advantages to
both borrower and lender are listed below:
BORROWER
1. Fixed rate financing
2. Interest rate of 100-200 basis points below conventional
rates
3. Higher loan-to-value ratio (80-100%)
4. Low debt coverage ratio
5. Loan proceeds to the developer are tax free until sale of
building
6. Control over the real estate
LENDER
1. Stable monthly coupon
2. Inflation hedge thru participation in cash flow or residual
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3. Secure debt position 3
This type of loan allows the lender to share in the
benefits of equity without being exposed to the equity risk.
The borrower benefits by achieving many of the things
conventional loans are moving away from, ie. up to 100%
financing, low interest rates initially when the project will
need this advantage the most, and fixed rates for long term
funds. The developer is also reducing his risk since he is
essentially "selling the future" by financing out of a larger
portion of his value up front and paying less current interest
in exchange for the uncertainty of future equity value.
A typical deal today for a credit borrower would involve a
cummulative preferred return of 8 1/2% on a 80-100% loan with a
25-50% participation in cash flow and residual (amounting to an
additional 2-3% IRR) for a total yield of 10 1/2 - 11 1/2% IRR.
Less creditworthy deals will show a higher coupon (9-11%) and
the participation component would bring the overall yield to
12-14%. There are many variations to these deals and the
particular needs of the parties involved will determine the
features of the loan. Some possible options are:
1. Coupon increases at a fixed amount each year up to a
predetermined cap
2. Developer or lender get a preference on residual
before the 50/50 split
3. Guarantee or sinking fund supports the coupon up to a
certain level
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4. The coupon may or may not be cummulative or preferred
5. The loan may be fully recourse or non-recourse
In structuring a participating deal, it is important to
recognize that the IRS looks at all proceeds above the coupon
from a participating loan (cash flow and residual) as
"contingent interest" up to a certain point. If the level of
participation exceeds this unknown percentage, the IRS can
reclassify the debt as equity which means a less favorable tax
treatment for the developer. Both borrower and lender wish to
avoid this and, as a result, do not structure participating
loans with more than a 90% participation percentage for the
lender. Often it is much less and a typical deal is 50%
participation.
PARTICIPATING MORTGAGE - COSTS AND APPLICATIONS
The participating mortgage structure has been around for a
long time and benefits from the standardization of documentation
that comes with continuous use. Since there are no real
ownership issues to be documented with this structure
(participating loans just "act" like equity) the agreement is
relatively simple.
Although a variety of "features" can add to the complexity
of these deals, the most expensive and time consuming ones such
as rating and credit enhancement are not required. Attorney's
fees and other fees (exclusive of bank closing costs and
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spreads) range from $30,000 - $200,000 depending on complexity.
The time commitment can be moderately intensive and deals of
less than $5 million are probably not worth the added effort.
It is, however, one of the more viable available techniques for
the small to medium sized deals. Larger deals benefit from some
economies of scale. The maximum size is determined by the
lending limit of the institution and a single source loan over
$150 million would probably be difficult to secure.
CONVERTIBLE MORTGAGE - DEFINITION
The convertible mortgage is similar to the participating
mortgage with one important difference; the lender has the
security of knowing he can turn the loan into actual ownership
of the property at some point in the future (convertibles are
popular with Japanese investors who like to own real estate).
In contrast, the participating loan just "acts" like equity
during the term of the loan and has no rights to become equity.
When the loan expires the lender gets his principal back and
walks away. With a convertible loan the lender still
participates in equity benefits during the loan term but at
conversion he walks away with a deed. The sacrifice by the
lender is an even lower coupon rate on the obligation than the
participating loan.
The borrowers advantage in this type of structure, in
addition to the same advantages noted in the participating
structure, is an even lower pay rate, often 200-400 basis
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points below conventional mortgages (7%). The lender's
advantage is that he is given a variety of options at loan
maturity (usually five years). He can either call the loan,
renew at pre-determined terms or assume ownership by converting
the unpaid balance into equity and buying out the owners
interest at a pre-determined price. 4 The "pre-determined price"
feature gives him a hedge against inflation. He can compare
market values to his pre-determined price and choose whichever
option is most economically attractive. In this way he has an
added measure of control over the real estate.
The reality of the convertible loan is that, contrary to
the name, few of them are ever converted because of the tax
implications. Conversion is a sale and therefore a taxable
event. As noted earlier, both the borrower and the lender want
to postpone this occurance as long as possible.
An example of the terms of a recent convertible loan placed
on a recently completed New York office building are as follows:
* $185 million appraised value of the building
* $100 million first mortgage (existing)
* $85 million convertible mortgage placed (100% of value)
* 7% preferred return ($10 million sinking fund
established to support coupon)
* 50/50 split of cash flow prior to conversion
* 50/50 split of equity at conversion
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CONVERTIBLE MORTGAGE - COSTS AND APPLICATIONS
The documentation for a convertible mortgage is
significantly more complicated than a participating mortgage due
to the possibility of a change of ownership if the loan is
converted. In addition to the loan documents, a joint venture
agreement must be drafted (assuming conversion is only for a
percentage of the property and not 100% ownership) that outlines
control of the property, division of equity, tax aspects, etc.
Attorney fees are considerably higher than a participating
mortgage ($60,000 - $250,000) because the cost of the ownership
documentation is added to the cost of the participating
documentation. If a pension fund is the lender the cost of
documenting their ownership in compliance with ERISA laws as
much as doubles the attorney's fees. The convertible loan is
more time intensive also, thus the minimum deal size to justify
its use is higher ($10 million and up). Scale economies are
realized with increased size and lending limits determine the
maximum loan amount.
ACCRUAL AND ZERO COUPON MORTGAGE - DEFINITION
The accrual loan, like the participating or convertible
mortgage, was designed to reduce a developer's annual interest
costs at the expense of future value. Unlike the participating
loan, interest is calculated at the market rate for conventional
mortgage loans, but a reduced amount is actually paid each
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month (pay rate). The difference between the pay rate and the
coupon is added to the loan balance and interest is calculated
on the entire amount. However, the monthly payment remains
fixed. The day of reckoning comes when the term expires and the
accumulated interest causes the loan repayment amount to be
considerably higher than the original principal.
The zero coupon loan is simply the extreme example of an
accrual loan in that no interest is paid monthly and the entire
amount is added to the loan total causing the principal to
double in slightly over six years and triple in just over ten
5years (at 10%)
Besides a lower interest payment, the advantages of the
accrual loan are: a) the developer gets the tax benefit of
writing off the added interest expense and, b) he is not giving
up any of the equity in his project. He is also getting an ever
increasing loan without going thru the process of applying for
another mortgage. As shown by the doubling and tripling in the
above example, this can get out of hand if not closely
monitored. Many lenders will have an "equity maintenance
requirement"6 to guard against the loan exceeding the value of
the property. This provision requires the developer to
contribute more equity to the project if the loan-to-value
surpasses a specified limit.
Lenders will use this type of loan with credit developers
as a means of keeping more funds working. They are earning
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interest on their interest and, if the project is secure, it is
a good way to put out a larger amount of money at favorable
rates.
An innovative type of accrual loan is the "bow-tie" loan.
This instrument is a floating rate loan with a provision that
all interest above a fixed minimum be deferred to loan
maturity.7 The loan term is typically five to ten years and it
may or may not be amortizing. There is usually little or no
pre-payment penalty. A loan of this type functions much in the
same way as an interest rate cap (see Chapter III. "Interest
Rate Cap") with payments floating up to a specified ceiling
then, all interest that exceeds that level accrues until loan
maturity. The cap is different in that no further interest is
paid or accrues after the ceiling is reached.
ACCRUAL & ZERO COUPON MORTGAGE - COSTS AND APPLICATIONS
Accrual loans are the least complicated of the creative
structures discussed in this paper. Fees are only marginally
more than a straight mortgage loan so their use is open to
almost the entire spectrum of deal sizes. There is a credit
issue involved since negative amortization will continually
increase the loan principal thereby effecting the lender's
willingness to extend this type of loan to less than
creditworthy customers. There is no significant additional time
commitment and the maximum size is determined by the lending
limit of the institution.
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GROUND LEASE - DEFINITION
The ground lease does not fall into either the category of
a mortgage or a securitized facility. It is, however, a
frequently used tool in creative real estate finance. The long
term ground lease serves to separate ownership of the land from
the building. The objective of doing so may be tax, security or
income motivated. The ground lease may be a tool used by either
the buyer or the seller to accomplish his goals.
To best describe how it can benefit the parties involved,
examples of two different approaches to using a ground lease are
described below:
Example #1: In this particular deal the owner of the
property (land and building) was motivated by providing an
annuity for his children (estate planning) and avoiding taxes.
He was willing to forgo a market sales price for his project to
accomplish these goals. The buyer was looking for an above
market return on his funds and was willing to assume some market
risk to achieve this goal.
The solution involved the sale of the building component
along with a long term lease on the land. The elements of the
deal were as follows:
* 375,000 square foot office building
* Owner sold building to buyer for $30 million ($15 million
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equity and assumption of a $15 million mortgage) which was
a significantly reduced price from the then current market
value ($80.00/sq.ft. in an $180.00/sq.ft. market)
* Buyer signed a 90-year ground lease at a below market
rent, but with an escalation feature that annually
increases the ground rent by the CPI. Buyer also gets the
option to purchase the ground at a fixed price ($30
million) at the end of the lease.
With this structure, the owner minimizes his taxable gain
by accepting a reduced price for the property. In return he
gets a ground lease that escalates at the full rate of inflation
(typically ground rent is fixed or has a lesser escalation) thus
providing the annuity he desires for his children. He is also
in a very secure position (first position) as the land owner.
His descendants will receive $30 million at the end of the
ground lease in 90 years, but on a present value basis, this
figure is an insignificant amount ($16,939 discounted at 10%).
The buyer puts out $15 million for the purchase of the
building and, after ground rent and interest on existing debt,
receives a 12% return on his funds, which is well above what he
would receive on a straight mortgage or on a full price purchase
of both the building and the land. He also has the option to
own the land at the end of the term for virtually nothing
($16,939 present value). His risk in the deal is that his
increase in rent from the building will not exceed the CPI
escalation he is paying the land owner, thus potentially eroding
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his 12% return.
Example #2. This example turns the parties around and
makes the buyer the ground lessor. In this instance ,the buyer
is looking for the security of land ownership and an above
market return. The seller is still trying to minimize taxes but
is motivated to take as much cash out of he transaction as
possible. The sequence of events are:
* Seller sells land to buyer at a below market rate then
leases it back
* Seller takes out a participating mortgage from the
buyer on the building
The seller, in this case, accomplishes his goal of getting
cash out by both selling the land and financing out of the
equity in the building. His "minimize tax" goal is achieved
because the re-finance proceeds are not currently taxable and
the reduced price for the ground minimizes his gain.
The buyer/lender has the security of knowing he is in the
senior position as owner of the land in the event of a default
and he receives an above market return on his participating
mortgage plus rent on the ground.
GROUND LEASE - COSTS AND APPLICATIONS
The ground lease, especially the unsubordinated ground
lease, can be a fairly complex agreement with moderate to
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extensive legal fees required for the documentation and
negotiation. The problem lies with how to structure the deal to
insure that improvements to the land are financeable with the
ground lessor remaining in first claim position in the event of
a foreclosure (first mortgage lenders typically require an
unsubordinated position).
Attorney fees would range from $20,000 to $50,000. There
are not many other expenses involved and the time commitment is
equivalent to negotiating a participating mortgage. However,
the ground lease component is usually only a portion of the
financing structure so the expense of financing the rest of the
project (the building that sits on the ground) should be
considered as well. A ground lease could be used in small
transactions as well as large ones with the only condition being
that very small deals would probably not justify the time
commitment and attorneys fees involved.
SECURITIZATION
The securitization of the commercial real estate mortgage
market has been heralded, primarily by the people who stand to
gain the most from its utilization, as the method by which
virtually all commercial real estate will be financed in the
years to come. The reality is that, although securitized
techniques have made inroads into real estate finance, the
total number of transactions actually performed with these
techniques has been much lower than originally predicted.
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Securitization is a very broad term that encompasses a
great variety of specific financial instruments. The basic
concept behind securitization, in the real estate context, is
the sale of traditional financial securities (bonds, commercial
paper, limited partnerships, etc.) that are backed by a
non-traditional form of collateral, real estate. The
circumstance that motivated their use was the developer's
interest in tapping financial markets that could offer him lower
cost funds and higher loan amounts. Recognizing a potentially
lucrative source of fees, Wall Street created real estate
backed products that took large financing requirements and broke
them down into smaller amounts within reach of a larger group of
investors.
In their effort to promote these products to what is
currently a $1 trillion commercial mortgage market, Wall
Street cites the advantages of greater liquidity, fixed rate
financing, non-recourse debt, superior flexibility and low
pre-payment provisions, in addition to the aforementioned lower
cost of funds and access to larger pools of money.
The concept, in practice, has not taken hold with the level
of enthusiasm predicted at its inception. Many of the
individuals interviewed for this report, most of which had used
securitized techniques in the past, indicated scepticism in
their applicability to anything but the very largest
transactions and, without some streamlining of the mechanics of
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the process, questioned if the more complex techniques would
have any significant long term use at all.
Securitization, as it applies to commercial property,
suffers from several fundamental problems. The primary ones are
the amount of time, effort and money (fees) associated with
bringing an offering to market. It is not uncommon for the
process to take over six months and, when the alternative for a
credit developer is calling his banker and having a loan
commitment in a few weeks, the decision over which alternative
to use becomes easy. In order to justify the extra effort of
these offerings, the developer must be able to show a
significant interest savings. However, with mortgage rates at
relatively low levels in the inverted yield curve environment
the financial markets are currently experiencing, the margins
are not there.
Developers cite a variety of other disadvantages:
1. Loan-to-value ratios may be lower to enhance the
security's credit rating requiring more equity
from the developer
2. Restrictions on the property
3. Scrutiny of the rating agencies
4. Lack of a well established secondary market for some
types of securities
5. Required guarantees
Most forms of securitization have been around for less than
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ten years so the jury is still out on their eventual position in
the marketplace. However, it is safe to assume that in the
current interest rate environment their applicability is highly
limited. A brief review of the various types of products that
have achieved some level of success is given below.
MORTGAGE BACKED SECURITIES - DEFINITION
Mortgage backed securities are a note or a bond that uses
only the real estate or a combination of the real estate and
some form of credit enhancement as security for the bondholders.
The proceeds from the bonds provide the developer with long
term, fixed-rate, non-recourse financing at below market rates
with no loss of equity. The bondholders receive a yield
comparable to a rated corporate bond.
Although not required, a rating from one of the major bond
rating agencies (Standard & Poors, Moody's, Duff & Phelps)
broadens the marketability of these bonds to investors who can
only invest in rated securities. (See Chapter III., "Rating" and
"Credit Enhancement"). To take maximum advantage of the low
interest rates provided by these bonds, the developer strives
for an AAA rating. For lower rated issues, the interest rate
rises sharply to the point of quickly becoming an uneconomical
financing alternative. Therefore, using a mortgage backed bond
is simply a function of the creditworthiness of the borrower,
the real estate and/or the tenants who occupy the real estate.
This limits the applicability of this tool to only the most well
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established developers for buildings with long term leases from
high credit tenants in first class locations since this is the
only type of project that is able to earn an AAA rating.
An example of the level of quality and security required to
take maximum advantage of this type of instrument is the IBM
office complex in Sommers, New York. This was the first
building to receive the highest rating from both Standard &
Poors and Moody's.9 A review of the specifics of the project
will indicate why:
IBM OFFICE COMPLEX - SOMMERS, NEW YORK
* 1.1 million sq. ft.
* 100% leased to IBM
* Mortgage secures the note
* Lease term exceeds the term of the notes
* Joint venture between IBM, Shorenstein & Co., and
Bechtel Investments
Landmark projects such as Rockefeller Center, The Chrysler
Building, and the American Express Headquarters in the World
Financial Center are among the projects that were unable to
secure AAA ratings when they issued mortgage backed bonds. It
is clear that this is a limited use financial instrument for
anything but "blue chip" deals.
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COMMERCIAL PAPER - DEFINITION
The use of commercial paper in real estate, like mortgage
backed bonds, has its roots in corporate finance. Commercial
paper was originally designed as a means by which corporations
could avoid using the banks to fund short term cash requirements
by issuing unsecured paper directly to other corporations. The
corporation's rating is the only security. The term of the
paper is typically 30-60 days with a maximum of 270 days (if
longer, it can not be called commercial paper and it has to be
registered with the Securities Exchange Commission). The paper
can be replaced at maturity with a new issue and, when combined
with an interest rate swap, can serve as a medium to long term
instrument by continually reissuing the paper.
The theory behind commerical paper is that interest rates
for short term funds (15-270 days) have historically been
significantly lower than long term funds, so if a developer can
access this market, while still fulfilling his primary need for
a long term fixed rate, he will save interest costs. Other
benefits include:
1. FLEXIBILITY - Every 30-60 days (average term of
commercial paper offerings) the developer can reassess
his position and move into another form of financing
if he wishes.
2. LIQUIDITY - The commercial paper market is $360
billion1 0 so finding buyers for a large financing
is not difficult under most circumstances.
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As with mortgage backed bonds, the system suffers from
great complexity in putting these offerings together causing a
long lag from inception to issue. The many parties involved
include:
1. Trading Bank - The investment bank that sells the
issue
2. Trustee Bank - A commercial bank that handles the
administrative aspects of the offering
3. Credit Enhancing Entity - A bank or insurance
company that guarantees the credit of the issue.
4. Paper Buyer - Corporations or money market funds
5. Attorneys - For all the documentation
Commercial paper is further complicated by the fact that every
30-60 days the paper must be re-issued so the administrative
time and effort is on-going, although not as extensive as at the
initial offering.
Since commercial paper is a short-term instrument, it is
not rated by the rating agencies and since developers do not
have high corporate ratings themselves, a rating must be
"purchased". Banks, insurance companies and certain
corporations with AAA ratings will credit enhance the issue (for
a substantial fee) if they feel the deal is secure enough to
warrant the risk (see Chapter III. "Credit Enhancement"). The
due diligence process is rigorous and only the most secure deals
will be good enough to justify a AAA credit enhancement.
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MORTGAGE BACKED SECURITIES & COMMERCIAL PAPER - COSTS AND
APPLICATIONS
Both mortgage backed securities and commercial paper have a
tremendous number of fixed and variable costs associated with
their issuance. In summary, these expenses are:
Fixed Expenses
1. Rating fee
2. Appraisal
3. Legal printing
4. Advertising
5. Administration
Variable Expenses
1. Placement fee
2. Credit enhancement fee
3. Legal fee
4. Accounting fee
5. Trustee fee
6. Title insurance
The size and complexity of the issue can cause the total
fees to fluctuate over a broad spectrum but, to generalize,
adding a 100-200 basis point annual spread over the appropriate
bond or commercial paper rate would not be unreasonable for
these types of deals. The cost of credit enhancement alone is
50-100 basis points/year which makes up the largest component of
51
the fee structure. Attorneys fees would exceed $100,000 for any
issue and $1 million+ fees are possible for very large, complex
offerings.
With commercial paper, since it is a variable rate
facility, the developer has the added expense of the purchase of
an interest rate swap or a cap. This could add anywhere from 50
basis points to several hundred basis points to the annual cost
of the program depending on the then current prices and level of
protection for these features. Also, commercial paper turns
over every 30-60 days and must be re-issued so the ongoing costs
associated with marketing this paper must be included in the
economic analysis of its use.
The time it takes to bring a mortgage backed bond or
commercial paper offering to market is in excess of six months
and the developer leaves himself exposed to considerable
interest rate risk during that period. Mortgage backed
securities become difficult to justify under $50 million and
commercial paper, with greatly diminished base rate spreads in
the current inverted yield curve environment, is probably not
economic at all today. In a more normal yield curve (rising), a
$75 million minimum would be realistic for commercial paper.
The big advantage comes with the maximum deal size. The
market for these securities is large enough that offerings of up
to $1 billion can be absorbed as either bonds or commercial
paper. However, real estate backed commercial paper has not
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been widely used and only represents less than 1% of all
commercial debt outstanding. 11
PUBLIC REAL ESTATE SECURITIES - DEFINITION
Publicly issued real estate securities (REITs, public and
private limited partnerships) have experienced a roller coaster
existance in the last twenty years. The REIT first came on the
scene in the 1970's and, after enjoying great initial
popularity, fell quickly out of favor losing millions of
investor dollars in the process. Only in the last few years
have REITs made a minor comeback.
As indicated by Table 1. below, TRA 1986 took a severe
toll on the public market, especially private limited
partnerships, with the removal of the lucrative tax incentives
previously associated with these real estate investments.
TABLE 1.
MONEY RAISING VOLUME ($BILLION)12
1984 1985 1986 1987 1988
PUBLIC L.P. 5.1 6.9 7.0 6.7 .4.4
REIT 2.7 4.3 4.4 2.7 2.8
TOTAL PUBLIC 7.8 11.2 11.4 9.4 7.2
PRIVATE L.P. 10.0 8.5 3.5 2.0 1.5
TOTAL 17.8 19.7 14.9 11.4 8.7
The REIT is a structure into which a developer can deposit
a property or group of properties then sell "shares" in the form
of debt and/or equity to private investors. The primary
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advantage of this ownership format is liquidity for the
investor. The shares are traded publicly so the investor can
easily determine the market value and sell or buy more with the
ease of buying or selling a stock. Unlike a typical corporate
stock, though, the profit from the performance of the assets
(income from real estate properties in the REIT) is only taxed
at the individual level if certain distribution criteria are
met.
The primary purpose for these public securities is to
provide an alternative to bank financing for the smaller
developer. Not to say they do not work for large deals, but in
comparison to the other securitized structures which completely
preclude the small and medium sized projects, the public market
is a valuable alternate source of funds for the lower end of the
market.
A recent application of these products is to market them to
smaller Japanese companies and Japanese investors. The Japanese
Ministry of Finance will only allow certain large Japanese
companies direct ownership of U.S. real estate so, to avoid this
restriction, smaller companies and individuals are buying U.S.
REITs and limited partnerships to participate in the investment
opportunities U.S. real estate provides. REITs are especially
popular because they "look" more like equity than, say, limited
partnerships or securitized bonds, so they have a broader appeal
to equity oriented Japanese investors.13
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PUBLIC REAL ESTATE SECURITIES - COSTS AND APPLICATIONS
Limited partnerships and REITs sold to individual
investors offer a more reasonable fee structure. The two
largest fees, credit enhancement and interest.rate hedges, are
usually not required. The documentation and compliance
requirements will be costly since the offering is a registered
security. Legal fees would probably range in the $40,000 -
100,000 area.
Creating an offering memorandum and a partnership agreement
can require a significant up-front time commitment but 3-6
months is probably realistic. The minimum deal size is
considerably lower at $10 million.
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CHAPTER III. FINANCIAL "FEATURES":
DEFINITION, COSTS AND APPLICATIONS
Many of the financial instruments described above can be
made even more useful by incorporating one or more of the
following tools: interest rate hedges, earn out, guarantees,
etc. These are frequently utilized in real estate finance to
minimize risk or modify the terms of creative financing
agreements.
As with the mortgages and the securitized products, there
are some limits to the use of these features but the
restrictions and economies of scale are generally less of a
problem. The small and medium sized project does not have as
much of a disadvantage since most fees are either based on a
percentage of the financing or are negotiated clauses that have
no direct fee associated with their use.
Figure 2., below, shows their most appropriate
applications as a function of deal size:
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FIGURE 2.
CREATIVE FINANCING "FEATURES" SHOWN BY
APPLICABLE TRANSACTION SIZE
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HEDGES
Hedging is the process of minimizing interest rate risk by
fixing or limiting the developer's exposure to the variability
of the financial markets. Hedging products-were created in
response to the dramatic increase in volatility the financial
markets experienced in the 1970's. Moves of 20 basis points or
more per day1 were not uncommon and made the risk of floating
rate debt unacceptable to many borrowers, thus a new array of
products were created to give the borrower certainty over his
interest exposure at the outset.
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The major cost issues to consider with interest rate hedges
are how much "insurance" do you want to buy and from what
interest rate event do you want to be protected. The price is
set accordingly. Cost to the developer is a percentage of the
total financing with minimal fixed costs. Therefore, scale
economies do not necessarily favor the larger deals with these
features. There are a myriad of hedging techniques available
but only the most frequently used will be discussed herein.
1. Interest Rate Cap
The interest rate cap serves as a ceiling that the
devloper's variable rate loan will not exceed regardless of the
upward movement of the base rate (prime, LIBOR, etc.). For a
fee that is usually amortized into the interest rate, the seller
of the cap, typically a bank, will reimburse the cap purchaser
for any interest cost incurred above the specified level. The
buyer picks the base rate, period of coverage, level of the cap
and the dollar amount of protection, then the bank quotes a
price based on its perceived risk for providing the level of
insurance desired by the buyer.
The cap can be modified in a variety of ways. Some of the
more creative caps available today are listed below:
1. Participating cap - A cap that shares a
percentage -of the "benefit" of rates being below
the cap level with the seller. Most cost
efficient if the buyer expects rates to
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fluctuate moderately either up or down.2
2. Stepped-up cap - A cap that increases the maximum
protection level over time.
3. Delayed cap - A cap set today for future protection
(ie. begins one year out).
The cost of putting an interest rate cap on a financing
instrument is based on the length of term of the protection and
the ceiling rate selected. Prices are set by the issuer (bank)
based upon its perception of interest rate movements. For
example, if rates are perceived as moving quickly upward and the
developer wants protection for a long period of time, ie. ten
years, within 1-2% of the current base rate, the developer will
pay a very significant premium for that tight protection
(possibly as much as 6% of the loan amount paid as a one' time
fee up front). However, if the term is shorter,ie. two years,
and the ceiling is set 4% above current rates in a falling rate
environment, the cap may cost less than 10 basis points.
Caps are generally considered an expensive hedge,
especially if the cap level is set close to current interest
rates (within 150 basis points). They allow the developer to
"have his cake and eat it too" by being able to participate in
the full benefit of a downward movement in rates while still
being limited in his exposure if rates go up. Its best
application is in a situation where the developer does not
anticipate a near term increase in rates but, if one should
occur, the deal would be severly impacted. Setting a cap 400
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basis points above current rates is more economical and provides
"disaster insurance" for the project.3 The most commonly used
caps currently cost 40-150 basis points/year.
2. Interest Rate Collar
The collar is similar to the cap in that it sets a maximum
interest rate exposure for the developer. The difference is
that, along with the ceiling provided by the cap, there is a
floor under which the developer will no longer receive the
benefit of a decrease in interest rates. The floor allows the
lender to participate in the benefit normally received by the
developer in a decreasing rate environment and, as such, is less
expensive than a cap. The lender will typically want to set the
floor at or near current rates and, unlike a cap, there is a
credit consideration with this feature because, if rates move
downward, the developer will be required to reimburse the bank
for the difference between the base rate and the collar's floor
rate.
The application of a collar is similar to a cap in that it
should be viewed as "disaster insurance", ie. the deal will be
severely impacted if rates go up. It is simply a less expensive
way to provide this insurance.
Like a cap, the price is quoted based on the location of
the stops, but most collars trade in the 30-100 basis
points/year range. The deal size is not restricted but the less
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creditworthy developers may be excluded from using collars due
to the credit issue involved.
3. Interest Rate Swap
The purpose for a developer to utilize an interest rate
swap is typically to convert a variable rate loan into a fixed
rate loan. This is a very valuable tool in the array of
financial products in that it can completely remove interest
rate risk from the equation.
The mechanics of this process involves the matching of a
party interested in securing fixed rate financing (developer)
with a party who wants variable rate (bank). The counterparties
then agree to fund the impact of interest rate fluctuations with
each other to maintain the fixed rate or variable rate coupon of
each loan. They do not actually exchange loan liabilities.
Each party remains responsible for their original loan. As with
the collar, there is a credit risk assumed by the bank in that
if rates go down the developer may not fulfill his obligation to
cover the difference. Only the most creditworthy developers are
afforded the use of this option (unless the swap is performed
with the same bank as the original mortgage loan and the real
estate secures the payment).
The swap is the least expensive and most appropriate
product if the developer believes rates are going up in the near
term. It is the least expensive because the developer does not
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participate in any of the benefit of a downward movement in
rates. Swaps can be customized to meet the exact needs of a
developer by having delayed or stepped-up starts or by utilizing
a built-in swap that activates automatically if rates should
reach a certain level. 4
Arranging a swap is not that difficult since a well
established market exists for both sides of the transaction but,
even so, most swap houses won't put the transaction together for
a loan of less than $10 million. Swaps are currently trading at
50-75 basis points/year.
4. Other Hedges
Many of the same benefits provided by caps, collars and
swaps can be achieved thru hedging techniques involving the
financial futures markets. Trading options on treasuries can
fix a rate or cap a rate by providing offsetting gains should
the markets turn against you. The way to use these hedges is as
follows:
1. To fix a rate (like a swap) = short treasuries;
if the developer's financing costs go up, the short
position will provide an offsetting gain
2. To cap a rate = purchase a put option
3. To collar a rate = sell a call option and purchase a
put option5
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RATING
The recently established (1984) procedures for rating
commercial real estate by Standard & Poors, Moody's and Duff &
Phelps is a fundamental component of mortgage backed securities.
Without it, the market for these securities would be highly
limited since most purchasers do not have the time or ability to
individually analyze each securitized offering. Having an
independent analysis performed on the property not only gives
credibility to the issue but it opens the market to purchasers
who by law, investment policy or charter are required to show a
rating to purchase the security.6
Commercial real estate has proven to be a difficult
commodity to rate due to the unique qualities of each piece of
real estate. Also, the application of the rating procedure is
so new there is no historic data from which to draw. As a
result, achieving the highest rating, and the associated low
borrowing cost for which the rating qualifies, is an extremely
difficult task for a real estate project. Familiarity and track
record will eventually begin to ease the scrutiny applied to
real estate and open the options for rating to a broader range
of properties.7 The cost of having a property rated is not
particularly high, usually in the 5 basis points range. The
rating agencies are not interested in projects of less than $10
million.
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CREDIT ENHANCEMENT
Credit enhancement can mean a variety of things (a complete
discussion of which is beyond the scope of this paper) but, for
the purpose of this discussion, the bank letter of credit and
the surety bond from a major insurance company are the most
frequent applications.
Credit enhancement is the process by which a highly rated
entity (bank, insurance company or corporation) provides a
guarantee of performance that allows a real estate developer to
issue some form of capital market security. Instead of having
the real estate itself rated, an unrelated party "loans" its
rating to secure the debt.
Mortgage backed securities use this product if a high
enough rating was not achieved on the property to qualify for
the desired interest rate or in lieu of subjecting themselves to
the scrutiny of the rating process. However, credit enhancement
can be used in conjunction with acquiring a rating on the real
estate as well. Enhancing a property to be rated serves to
expedite the rating process and adds strength to the case for a
high rating. Commercial paper is not rated and requires the use
of some type of credit enhancement to make it marketable.
The cost of credit enhancement, in the form of a letter of
credit (LC) or surety bond, involves two expenses:
1. Legal fees
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2. LC or surety bond issuer fee.
The legal time is not extensive and fees generally run in the
$10,000-30,000 range. The major expense is in the risk premium
the credit enhancer receives for guaranteeing the deal. The
rate can vary based on banking relationships, conservative debt
coverage and leverage ratios or other indemnifications8 but
75-100 basis points annually is a typical fee for this service.
Recently Japanese bank competition for this business has had the
effect of bringing the cost of credit enhancement down.
Since credit enhancement is primarily used for the large
securitized deals, its applicability correlates with deal sizes
of mortgage backed bonds and commercial paper. Small, less
creditworthy deals would have a difficult time finding a highly
rated bank to provide the enhancement since the credit enhancer
must evaluate the property in much the same way as a rating
agency would.
OTHER GUARANTEES
The master lease or a guarantee of cash flow from the
property serve as a risk reduction technique for the lender thus
allowing the developer to borrow a larger amount of the value of
the property. With a master lease, the developer agrees to
"lease" all or part of the remaining vacant space in the
building for a specified period of time to insure that the
lender or buyer receives the pro-forma rent from the property.
The master lease is essentially guaranteeing the "top line" of
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the income statement and therefore is providing no protection
from operating risk on the property. A better guarantee, from
the lender's perspective, is a guarantee of net operating income
(after operating costs), which maintains the developer's
attention on the overall performance of the real estate.
Recourse debt is another type of guarantee that is
actively negotiated in virtually every loan agreement. A full
recourse loan guarantees repayment of debt with the security
being the developer's personal assets. Developers will go to
great lengths to avoid putting their "personal signature" on a
real estate loan and lenders will be equally adament in their
insistence for that signature to keep the developer focused on
the success of the property.
Finally, cross-collateralization pledges a developer's
other real estate assets as a guarantee of repayment for the
current loan. If the borrower should default the lender could
liquidate existing projects in which the developer owned an
interest to satisfy the current debt.
All of these guarantees enhance the security of the loan
and thus allow the developer the ability to borrow on more
favorable terms. The master lease or guarantee of cash flow may
have a letter of credit supporting the promise and would,
therefore, have a fee associated with their use. However, most
guarantees do not involve a fee for the developer since they are
simply negotiated clauses between the borrower and the lender in
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a loan agreement and do not involve a third party.
EARN OUT
The earn out is a creative feature negotiated into a loan
agreement that allows the developer to finance a larger portion
of his property if certain performance standards for net
operating income (N.O.I.) are met. The earn out is primarily
utilized to mitigate perceived differences between the lender's
and the developer's different estimates of worth and to maintain
an incentive for the developer to achieve maximum performance
from the real estate even after he has financed out of the
majority of value in the property.
An example of how this tool works is as follows:
1. The developer claims the building is worth $33 million
and is seeking a participating mortgage for that
amount based on his estimate of N.O.I.
2. The lender estimates value at $30 million based on
his somewhat less aggressive N.O.I. estimate
3. Instead of not coming to terms, the lender agrees to
finance the $30 million initially, based on his
conservative estimate of N.O.I., but with the
provision that if a higher number is achieved he
will capitalize the additional N.O.I. and fund up
to $3 million over the original $30 million, thus
achieving the developer's original financing goal.
The earn out creates an incentive for the developer to put forth
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an extra effort in achieving top performance from the property
thus increasing the value of the lender's equity participation.
There is no fee involved because, like the various guarantees
discussed above, this is a negotiated agreement between the
borrower and the lender.
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CHAPTER IV. REAL ESTATE FINANCE: TODAY AND IN THE FUTURE
SUMMARY OF REAL ESTATE FINANCE TODAY
Real estate finance has evolved into a highly sophisticated
business with new, increasingly complex products being created
on a regular basis in response to changes in both the overall
economy and the current state of real estate development in the
United States. Chapter I. identified four overarching themes
that create the environment for the industry today:
1. Competition to place funds
2. Oversupply of commercial space
3. Increased volatility of interest rates
4. Changing tax status
The final chapter of this report summarizes how creative
financial products have responded to these forces and looks
ahead at what trends might be on the horizon that would create
the need for new financial instruments.
1. COMPETITION TO PLACE FUNDS
The finance industry has moved from the involvement of a
relatively small number of participants to a much broader, more
diverse group of potential financing sources: regulatory changes
brought in the savings and loans, unattractive investment
opportunities at home brought in the Japanese banks,
syndication brought in the individual investor and Wall Street
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brought in the capital markets. The result has been an
"oversupply of money" and the corresponding decrease in yields
for the traditional real estate lenders. Lenders have reacted
by changing their traditional products and offering mortgage
loans that achieve a higher overall yield through participation
in equity (participating or convertible mortgages) or accrual
structures that have a high coupon (to satisfy the loan
committee) but a lower pay rate (to satisfy the developer).
They have also responded to the erosion of their spreads by
offering fee compensated products. Credit enhancement and
interest rate hedges (caps, collars, swaps) are new sources of
income that help make up for the lost revenue from increased
competition for loans.
The impact of this competition on securitized deals is even
more profound. As base rates fall and mortgage lenders reduce
their spreads, the savings offered by commercial paper and
mortgage backed securities is minimized or even eliminated and
the added administrative effort required for these offerings
makes them uneconomic alternatives. Since rated bond and
commercial paper rates do not necessarily react downward to
mortgage lender's lower spreads, one of the parties that
originally created the competitive environment (Wall Street's
capital markets) gets squeezed out by the products they intended
to replace.
The borrower is the beneficiary of this oversupply
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situation. Coupon rates for mortgage loans are down and terms
are favorable for the credit developer. A movement away from
complex structures and back to basic mortgage loans to achieve
the lowest rate is the current response of many borrowers.
However, these are very dynamic markets and the lowest cost of
funds changes regularly. The astute developer should shop a
variety of sources and deal structures to achieve the best deal.
2. OVERSUPPLY OF COMMERCIAL SPACE
The financial community's response to overbuilt markets is
one of minimizing risk wherever possible. This, unfortunately,
is difficut to do while competing to place ever larger amounts
of money. These two contradictory goals get resolved by
financing secure, class "A" buildings at increasingly favorable
terms and less secure properties at considerably less favorable
terms ("flight to quality"). The less secure properties require
higher debt coverage ratios and receive lower loan-to-value
mortgage amounts than class "A" properties.
Secure cash flows, large equity contributions from the
developer and an emphasis on current income (vs. residual value)
are stressed by lenders today. Lenders may require that
developers buy a cap on a variable rate loan to limit their
risk, or put up a letter of credit or other guarantee to secure
the loan. Using a ground lease, with its secure first position,
may be a good strategy.
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Securitized deals, in an overbuilt, security oriented
environment, become even more difficult to do. High ratings are
harder to achieve, credit enhancements are more expensive and
selling a deal to the public is a tougher task.
In response to lower loan-to-value ratios and higher debt
coverage ratios, participating and convertible structures and
earn outs offer ways to finance larger amounts of the project's
value without placing increased demands on debt coverage.
Accrual loans can help a project through a long leasing period.
3. INCREASED VOLATILITY OF INTEREST RATES
The volatility of interest rates experienced by the
financial markets in the 1970's had a profound and lasting
effect on real estate finance. Lender's fear of exposure to a
recurrance of the broad market fluctuations of the period led to
the variable rate loan, much shorter loan terms and the demise
of the forward commitment. Real estate developers have spent
most of their creative energy trying to devise products that get
around these changes ever since.
Participating and convertible loans typically offer a fixed
coupon in exchange for equity ownership. Mortgage backed bonds
are fixed rate products as well. The purpose for using hedges
is to limit or eliminate the risk of variable rate financing.
In response to the shorter terms available, securitized
offerings have been structured as long term financing
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instruments to better compete with mortgages.
4. CHANGING TAX STATUS
Avoiding the payment of tax seems to be a time-honored
profession in all areas of the real estate business. Since TRA
1986 this has been much more difficult to do. From the lender's
side, the goal is to create as large of a return as possible
while still calling it "interest". The developer is most
concerned with the taxable gain of a sale.
Achieving these tax deferal goals have led to a variety of
creative structures that keep the taxable income down and
postpone the taxable gain as long as possible. In the mortgage
area, participating loans and convertible loans (if they are not
converted) are a means of avoiding a sale while still sharing
the benefits of equity ownership with the lender. The ground
lease can also be used for tax deferal purposes (as outlined in
Chapter II).
Where TRA 1986 increased the necessity of creative mortgage
structures, it all but eliminated the market for public real
estate securities. Retraction of the very favorable write-offs
associated with limited partnerships brought the syndication
business to a standstill.
In addition to responding to the economic themes discussed
above, there will always be a motivation to create new financial
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tools that cater to the basic needs of the borrower. Finding
ways to achieve lower interest rates, larger loans, and risk
reduction are the reasons for creative products in any
economic environment.
FUTURE TRENDS
Where is real estate finance headed? How will lenders and
developers respond to the market forces in effect today that
will form the groundwork for the future? What new products are
being created to meet the needs of the real estate community
during the next five years? The final section of this report
will speculate as to the changing role of the parties in real
estate finance and evaluate how mortgages and securitization may
attempt to meet the future demands of the industry.
FUTURE TRENDS: FINANCING SOURCES
As noted earlier, the number of participants in the
business has increased dramatically in the last twenty years.
Their relative positions and magnitude of their participation
will continue to change as some prove more capable of competing
in the new environment than others. I see changes in future
market share occuring like this:
1. Institutions -increasing
2. Banks and savings and loans - decreasing
3. Capital markets - increasing
4. Foreign investment - increasing
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5. Individuals - decreasing
The institutional investors have been in the real estate
investment business as long as anyone and have survived the
fluctuations of many market cycles. To compete they have had to
reduce their fixed mortgage spreads but they have responded to
this erosion in profit by coming up with new structures and
creative methods of participating in the upside of projects.
Banks and savings and loans have experienced a well
publicized period of difficulty during the most recent
overbuilding-induced default cycle. The excesses of the savings
and loans will cause government regulators to more closely
review their lending practices and, after being hurt so badly by
real estate, their overly aggressive attitude will change to one
of more conservative underwriting. Their primary business,
short term construction loans, is being eroded by institutions
who are offering construction financing today, securitization
that avoids the construction/permanent loan scenario by
supplying one financing for both and the Japanese banks who are
able to offer construction loans at lower rates.
The predictions that securitization will completely take
over the real estate finance world are probably exaggerated.
The capital markets will find a niche in supplying funds to
certain high credit projects that either must use these sources
to finance projects that are too large for the traditional
lenders or, as the spreads between mortgage rates and bond or
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commercial paper rates increases, deals that didn't make
economic sense previously become sufficiently attractive to
warrant the additional time and effort involved.
Foreign investment or more specifically, Japanese
investment, is a "sleeping giant" in the future of real estate
finance. Japanese lenders are currently at the construction
loan stage of their evolution into U.S. real estate finance but,
as they move up the learning curve and become more accustomed to
U.S. real estate lending practices and comfortable with the
types of creative deals that are being offered by other lenders,
they will begin competing for this business in an aggressive
manner. Since they are using a lower cost of funds, their deals
should be superior.
The individual investor does not look like a significant
force in real estate finance for the next few years. Without
tax benefits, public deals have difficulty making economic
sense. To be attractive they must offer passive income from
cash flow and, not only is it bard to find commercial deals with
a significant current return, if they are found, the
institutional investors are probably standing in line to finance
or buy them.
The overall trend towards more competition for real estate
impacts all parties in the lending community. This supply and
demand imbalance will have three potential outcomes:
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1. A shake-out of the weaker participants
2. Lower yields for all parties
3. A "move down the risk profile"
The first two points are self-explanatory but the third is
contrary to what most lenders perceive as occuring within their
industry. The finance professionals interviewed for this report
talked of higher debt coverage ratios, lower loan-to-value
ratios, recourse or other guarantees, etc. These are all signs
of a conservative underwriting position which is inconsistant
with a competitive, "too much money chasing too few deals"
environment. I see the lending industry taking on greater
increments of risk in the future to boost their returns and to
find ways to put out funds. The result of this increased risk
position may be moving into new, unfamiliar real estate products
such as land deals or making equity investments in to-be-built
development projects. One of the more well respected names in
the pension fund advisory business, Aldrich, Eastman and Waltch,
Inc., is making pension fund money available to finance
development companies. "Venture capital" is a reasonable
description of this investment.
Money moving down to smaller, more risky deals will also
be the result of this competitive situation. Both the
availability of more funds and an easing of conservative
underwriting policies will occur thus benefiting a greater
number of developers in the future.
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FUTURE TRENDS: MORTGAGES
The financial markets are constantly changing in response
to inflation, the price of alternate products, foreign currency
rates and the overall health of real estate developement. As a
result, it is difficult to speculate what types of financing
instruments will be popular one month to the next.
Sophisticated developers move from one type of financing
structure to the next as the all-in cost of using them
fluctuates with the markets.
The trend in place today could best be described as "back
to basics".1 Straight, long-term mortgage rates with no
participation are at very low levels (under 10%) in relation to
other more complex and time intensive forms of financing. The
attitude among developers towards complex structures is, "Why go
through the six month effort of putting a complicated
participating deal or a securitized issue together for only a
few basis points saved and a lot of headaches?".2
This is a short term situation though and I do not believe
that creative deal making will forever be displaced by "solid
basic underwriting". As spreads between rates fluctuate,
products that fell out of favor will be revived and new products
will be created to meet specific needs.
In addition to interest rate fluctuations, other trends
will have an impact on the mortgage market.
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I
1. Dividing and re-apportioning risk
2. Tax avoidance
3. Globalization
These overall themes are most likely to impact the way
mortgages are structured in the future. A discussion of these
trends follows.
1. Dividing and Reapportioning Risk
Dividing and reapportioning risk might also be referred to
as the "securitization of mortgages". As noted earlier, the
lender will be taking on more risk in the future and getting
into new product lines. An example of this is the New England
Insurance Company now offers two mortgages that are a departure
from their traditional basic mortgage products.
Mortgage #1. "A & B Structure" - This is a mortgage loan
that ties a different interest rate to different levels of
risk. The "A" portion is equivalent to their standard
mortgage deal with a 75% loan to value ratio and a
competitive interest rate. The "B" portion comes into
play if the borrower wants a higher loan to value (more
risk for the lender). The amount borrowed above 75%
carries a higher coupon rate. The result is, the lender
makes a riskier loan but the borrower pays an increased
price for that risk (securitization theory).
81
Mortgage #2. "Construction/Permanent Loan" - Construction
loans are obviously not new. However, in the past,
institutions did not make these higher risk loans. The way
it works is, the New England makes one fixed rate loan that
not only pays for construction of the project but
automatically converts into a long term mortgage at the end
of construction. The developer, must put up a letter of
credit for each dollar he draws on the construction portion
of the loan. The letter of credit requirement is removed
when the loan converts to a permanent loan at the end of
construction. The advantages are, the lender gets security
for his construction loan from the letter of credit,
thereby mitigating his construction risk, and the developer
only has to deal with one loan and one interest rate so he
is not exposing himself to interest rate risk either during
construction or upon completion of the project when he
would normally have to go into the long term mortgage
market.
2. Tax Avoidance
The change in tax laws effecting real estate will continue
to be a motivator for creative techniques that re-finance
properties to avoid a sale or create more "contingent interest"
instead of equity benefit. New York is the trend setter in this
movement towards financing around taxes. The participating and
convertible mortgage and ground lease will find broader
applications in the future and the tax free exchange will become
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a more common occurance.
3. Globalization
Eventually, the market for mortgage money will be the
world market. Developers will not only shop the institutions,
banks and capital markets but Japan, England and other
European markets as well. This is just beginning to happen
with foreign currency mortgages being arranged by U.S.
investment banks. Goldman Sachs offers a mortgage placed in
Japan (in yen) with Japanese insurance companies at mortgage
rates which can be several hundred basis points below domestic
rates.3 Lower debt coverage ratios in Japan give the added
advantage of developers being able to borrow larger amounts
against the value of their property.
A foreign currency deal brings a new level of risk into
real estate; currency risk. Fluctuating values between the yen
and the dollar will essentially change a loan written as a fixed
rate loan into a variable rateloan based on relative currency
movements. Hedging can be used to mitigate this risk.
FUTURE TRENDS: SECURITIZATION
The debate over the future of securitization rages on with
both sides making- compelling arguments. Those against say:
* Commercial real estate is too unique to securitize
* It takes too much time and effort to bring to market
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* The added costs are too high
* Adverse property conditions today make real estate
securities unattractive
* They are too complex
The supporters cite securitization's many advantages:
* Divides income and risk among the parties that can use
them the most (most efficient)
* Ability to finance large projects
* Costs will come down as familiarity increases
* Low rates, higher loan-to-value, lower debt coverage, no
loss of equity
Clearly today, with mortgage rates so low, securitization
only makes sense with large issues where economies of scale
bring the impact of fixed costs down and other opportunities to
borrow very large sums are limited. In the future, a return to
a more normal yield curve will bring back the favorable spreads
commercial paper rates have historically enjoyed and increased
familiarity and standardization of all securitized products will
eventually overcome much of the problem of high costs, too
complex and too much time and effort involved.
Familiarity is the biggest obstacle to the use of
securitized products. At this point in their evolution,
virtually every time a real estate backed offering is made
something about it is unique and has never been done before.
The result is that attorney's fees add up and the process runs
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very slowly as each step is negotiated and documented. The
rating and credit enhancement components are new also and, with
no historical data from which to draw and an untested product
(real estate), rating agencies and credit enhancers have chosen
to err on the conservative side when evaluating the
creditworthiness of real estate. With time, this will change
and what was once complex will become routine.
Forest City Capital Corporation is attempting to reduce the
complexity and bring commercial paper down to the smaller
developer. According to Cynthia Williams, Vice President, they
are putting together a program that aggregates many small,
multi-family development projects (as small as $5 million) into
one large commercial paper offering. The program works like
this:
* Primary parties involved
Forest City = mortgage banker
Insurance company = credit enhancer
Investment bank = seller of the paper
* The commercial paper funds both construction and
"permanent" financing (total of a 5 year term)
* 80% loan to value and 1.1 coverage
* Developer buys a cap
* Fees
Credit enhancement = 1%/year
Cap = .5%/year
Forest City fee = 1.5% one time fee
Attorney fees = $100,000 and up
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= 2.20%/year for a 5 year deal
With commercial paper rates at 9.00% the total cost of
funds, 11.20%, is well above mortgage rates for credit
developers. However, historically commercial paper has averaged
7.87%4 so there is a high probability that rates will decrease
as the yield curve moves back to normal.
It is also important to note that small developers may not
be able to borrow at the low rates institutions are offering
their best customers. Prime plus 1-4% (12-15% plus the cost of
any features, such as a cap) with additional interest rate risk
at the end of construction when a take out loan must be secured,
is a more likely alternative for the small developer. The
determining factor becomes the comparison between the credit
enhancer's perception of the developer's creditworthiness in
allowing him to be included in the commercial paper program
under his AAA rating vs. the lender's perception of the
developer's creditworthiness and the corresponding interest rate
offered for a straight loan.
If programs such as this prove to be successful, the small
and medium sized developer will have a useful new financing
alternative available to him. The key to success is informing
the finance community of the availability and method of
implementation of products such as this and streamlining the
process to the point of being competitive in time and effort
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Total Load
expended and expenses incurred in comparison to the mortgage
alternatives.
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1. Corbiere, Adrian, The New England
2. Kirschenbaum, Sam, Sonnenblick-Goldman Corp.
3. Brueggeman, William B., John Eisenberg, David M.
Porter, "Low Interest Rate Foreign Currency Financing for
Real Estate", Goldman Sachs - Real Estate Review, March 31,
1989.
4. Williams, Cynthia, Forest City Capital Corp.
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APPENDIX A: TERMINOLOGY
The vocabulary of real estate finance is growing increasingly
complex as the influence of Wall Street and the large
institutional investors is felt in what was previously a fairly
straightforward set of business terms. It seems that as new
products are created a technical term or acronym must be
attached to it to give it market appeal. To communicate with
the major players in real estate lending today, developers must
have an understanding of these terms.
Bullet Loan. A loan with a fixed interest rate and a balloon
payment due at the end of a three to ten year term.1
Commercial Paper. An unsecured promissory note, typically with
a maturity of six months or less, issued for a specific amount
and maturing on a speicific date.1
Convertible Mortgage. A secured debt instrument with an option
for the lender to participate in the equity of the mortgaged
property.
Credit Enhancement. A financial guarantee, such as a letter of
credit or a surety bond, that reduces the concerns of investors
that lack the time or expertise to evaluate securitized real
estate offerings. A credit rating by one of the bond rating
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agencies can also achieve this result. (See also Rated
commercial mortgage-backed securities.)1
Equity Kicker. A loan or lease provision that allows a lender
or a major tenant to participate in the cash flow or resale
proceeds of a real estate project. 1
Employee Retirement Investment Savings Act (ERISA). Federal
legislation that governs the investment policies of pension
funds.
Eurodollar Offering. A dollar-denominated public offering on
the London market, as opposed to a domestic public offering.
Going-in Cap Rate. First-year net operating income (NOI)
divided by present value (or purchase price); commonly used as a
measure of risk in real estate--the higher the cap rate, the
higher the perceived risk to the investor or lender.1
Hybrid Mortgage. A mortgage that combines a debt component
with an equity component; ie. a participating mortgage or
convertible mortgage.
Interest Rate Swap. A contract between lenders that allows the
exchange of a series of fixed interest payments for a series of
variable interest payments; a commonly used method of reducing
interest rate risk.1
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Internal Rate of Return (IRR). The rate of interest that
discounts the total cash flows received or anticipated by the
equity investor(s) back to a present value that is exactly equal
to the amount of the original equity investment.1
Letter of Credit (LC). A document issued by a financial
institution guaranteeing the payment of its client's debts up to
a stated amount for a specified period, thereby substituting the
bank's credit for that of the real estate buyer. (See also
Credit enhancement.) 1
London Interbank-offered Rate (LIBOR). An average of
interbank-offered rates for dollar deposits in the London
market. Variable rate loans are often pegged to this rate.
Mini-perm. A short term loan (five years or less) taken out
after obtaining a construction loan but before securing a
permanent loan. Such loans are typically sought when permanent
financing cannot be arranged at attractive terms.1
Negative Amortization. The gradual increase in total mortgage
debt that occurs when interest accrues on a mortgage at a faster
rate than it is paid.1
Rated Commercial Mortgage-backed Security (RCMBS). A publicly
traded security with a rating by one of the bond rating agencies
(Moody's, Standard & Poor's, Duff & Phelps) and backed by one
or more commercial mortgages. Under-writing agencies rated
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commercial mortgage-backed securities for the first time in
1985, giving issuers an important form of credit enhancement.
Securities backed by commercial mortgages have proved to be much
more difficult to rate than those backed by residential
mortgages because of the non-standard nature of the underlying
asset. 1
Securitization. The process whereby mortgages secured by real
estate assets are pooled and issued as tradable securities .
Purchase of the securities offers investors a passive, low-risk
vehicle for investing in real estate.1
Take-out Financing. A permanent, long-term loan that usually
replaces a construction loan when a development is completed.1
Terminal Rate. A capitalization ("cap") rate used to estimate
resale or reversion value at the end of the holding period.1
Zero Coupon Bond. A debt security that is issued at discount
from its face value and matures at face value over a term of
more than one year. No coupon (interest) payments are made over
the term of the bond.1
1. Gordon, Jacques N., "Of REMICs and CMOs: A Real Estate Glossary
for 1988 and Beyond", Real Estate Report, 1987.
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APPENDIX B: CURRENT MARKET INTEREST RATES (July 1989)1
SHORT TERM RATES:
Prime Rate...........................................
LIBOR - 90 Day.......................................
Treasury Bills.......................................
Commercial Paper.....................................
Eurodollar Time Deposits.............................
11.00%
9.18%
7.72%
9.05%
9.25%
LONG TERM RATES:
Treasury Bonds.......................................
Aa Utility Bonds.....................................
Mortgage Rates (Credit Borrowers).....................
8.22%
9.15%
9.50%
1. Gilpin, Kenneth N-., "Short-Term Rates Seen Declining", The New
York Times, July 10, 1989, D5.
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